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AGGREGATED ROYALTIES FOR TOP-DOWN FRAND DETERMINATIONS:  
REVISITING “JOINT NEGOTIATION” 
 
 









In an environment in which widely-adopted technical standards may each be covered by 
large numbers of patents, there have been increasing calls for courts to determine “fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) royalties payable to holders of standards-
essential patents (SEPs) using “top-down” methodologies.  Top-down royalty approaches begin 
with the aggregate royalty that should be payable with respect to all SEPs covering a particular 
standard, and then allocate a portion of the total to individual SEPs. Top-down approaches 
avoid many drawbacks associated with bottom-up approaches in which royalties for individual 
SEPs are assessed, often in an inconsistent and piecemeal manner, without regard for the other 
SEPs that cover the standard. Yet despite the potential benefits of top-down methodologies, one 
of the most promising means for determining aggregate royalty levels – joint agreement by the 
members of the relevant standards-development organization (SDO) – has gained little traction. 
The idea of SDO participants jointly negotiating FRAND royalties attracted the attention of 
commentators and antitrust agencies about a decade ago, when a handful of SDOs began to 
explore mandatory ex ante rate disclosure requirements. But few SDOs adopted such policies, 
and joint negotiations were never incorporated into the mainstream standardization process. 
One of the principal reason that SDOs have been hesitant to endorse joint royalty negotiations is 
the perceived risk of antitrust liability arising from concerted action among competitors. But as 
numerous commentators and antitrust officials have reiterated, this fear is largely misplaced in 
the context of industry standard-setting. Thus, SDOs should follow the lead of patent pools and 
begin more actively to determine aggregate patent royalty burdens for standards that they 
develop. In addition, antitrust and competition authorities should assure the market that 
collective agreement on aggregate royalty rates alone should not give rise to antitrust liability. 
 




*  Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. The author thanks Rick Brunell, John 
Dubiansky and Mark Patterson for thoughtful comments and discussion of this article. 








I.   THE CASE FOR AGGREGATED STANDARDS ROYALTIES 
 
A.  Many Patents, Many Royalties? 
 
Many standards development organizations (SDOs) require that their participants license 
patents that are essential to standardized products (standards-essential patents or SEPs) to 
product manufacturers on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). An 
extensive literature and growing body of case law exists regarding the determination of FRAND 
royalties.1 But even if individual royalty rates can be considered “fair” and “reasonable”, when 
large numbers of patents are involved, there is a risk that the total royalty burden on a 
standardized product can become excessive. This is the familiar issue of royalty stacking. As has 
been discussed extensively in the literature, royalty stacking is a variant of the well-known 
Cournot complements problem in which different firms each control necessary inputs to 
production and act in an uncoordinated manner when charging a manufacturer for the use of 
those inputs.2  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained, 
 
[r]oyalty stacking can arise when a standard implicates numerous patents, perhaps 
hundreds, if not thousands. If companies are forced to pay royalties to all [patent] 
holders, the royalties will ‘stack’ on top of each other and may become excessive in 
the aggregate.”3  
 
Under most current SEP licensing frameworks, the negotiation of FRAND license 
agreements is left to bilateral interactions between SEP holders and manufacturers of 
standardized products. In these cases, SEP holders have little incentive to consider royalty rates 
charged by anyone other than themselves. Yet some broadly adopted standards are covered by 
patents held by dozens and sometimes more than a hundred different firms.4 Thus, if each of 
____________________	
	
1 See, generally, Chryssoula Pentheroudakis & Justus A. Baron, Licensing Terms of Standard Essential 
Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases. JRC Science for Policy Report EUR 28302 at 95-96 (2017) (collecting 
and summarizing cases);  Jorge	L.	Contreras,	Patents,	Technical	Standards	and	Standards-Setting	Organizations:	
A	 Survey	 of	 the	 Empirical,	 Legal	 and	 Economics	 Literature,	 in	 RESEARCH	 HANDBOOK	 ON	 THE	 ECONOMICS	 OF	
INTELLECTUAL	 PROPERTY	 LAW:	 ANALYTICAL	 METHODS	 (Vol.	 2)	 (Peter	 Menell	 et	 al.,	 eds.,	 2017)	 (collecting	
literature).		 
2 See, e.g., Pierre Régibeau, Raphaël De Coninck and Hans Zenger, Transparency, Predictability, and 
Efficiency of SSO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing: A Report for the European Commission 15-17 (2016) 
(discussing relevance of Cournot complements problem in standard-setting); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013–15 (2007) (describing the problems of Cournot 
complements and double marginalization and their potential to lead to hold-up in SEP markets), Joseph Farrell, John 
Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 642 
(2007) (“the sum of the incremental values of [multiple] patents exceeds their value in combination”). 
3 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also In re. Innovatio IP Ventures, 
LLC Patent Litig., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *62 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“the determination of a RAND royalty must 
address the risk of royalty stacking”) 
4 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 







these SEP holders independently sought to maximize its royalty revenue, patent royalties could 
far exceed sustainable product prices.5 
 
Commentators disagree whether royalty stacking is currently having a significant impact 
on prices or innovation in industries such as wireless telecommunications that are heavily 
dependent on standardized technologies. Some researchers claim that there is no empirical 
evidence that royalty stacking is a significant issue in practice.6 Estimates of the actual royalty 
stack for mobile telephone products range from about 4-5%7 to 30% of the product price.8  But 
even if lower-end estimates are accepted, Pierre Régibeau et al. hypothesize that current royalty 
levels may be depressed due to uncertainty surrounding patent litigation and may rise once 
litigation is resolved.9 What’s more, there are clear indications that developers of standardized 
technologies are increasingly transferring SEPs to patent assertion entities (in some cases known 
as privateers) for the purpose of asserting those patents.10 If this trend continues, royalty stacking 
could become a serious issue for product manufacturers, particularly in emerging areas such as 
the Internet of Things and broadband 5G wireless connectivity.11 
 
Given the growing recognition of these issues, commentators, courts and policy makers 
have become increasingly attracted to mechanisms that take into account the aggregate royalty 
burden associated with a standard when considering the royalties owed to any particular patent 
holder. Thus, as the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted in Innovatio, 
“the determination of a [F]RAND royalty must address the risk of royalty stacking by 
																																																																																																																																																																														
	
patents]”); Bekkers, Rudi & Joel West. 2009. “The limits to IPR Standardization Policies as evidenced by Strategic 
Patenting in UMTS,” 33 Telecommunications Policy 80 (72 holders of SEPs covering ETSI’s 3G UMTS standard). 
5 See Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 at *213. 
6 See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 GEO. 
L.J. ONLINE 48, 61 (2015) (“By early 2015, more than two dozen economists and lawyers had disapproved or 
disputed the numerous assumptions and predictions of the patent-holdup and royalty-stacking conjectures.”); Anne 
Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of 
History? (Submitted for 122nd Meeting of the OECD Competition Committee, Dec. 17-18, 2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282014%2984&docla
nguage=en (also citing lack of empirical evidence). 
7 See J. Gregory Sidak, What Aggregate Royalty to Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-
Essential Patents?, 1 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 701 (2016); Keith Mallinson, Cumulative Mobile-SEP Royalty 
Payments No More Than Around 5% of Mobile Handset Revenues, WiseHarbor (2015), 
http://www.wiseharbor.com/pdfs/Mallinson%20on%20cumulative%20 
mobile%20SEP%20royalties%20for%20IP%20Finance%202015Aug19.pdf 
8 Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller, & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty 
Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones (Working Paper, May 29, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443848. But see Keith Mallinson, Smartphone Revolution: 
Technology Patenting and Licensing Fosters Innovation, Market Entry, and Exceptional Growth, IEEE CONSUMER 
ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE, Apr. 2015, 60-66 (challenging findings of Armstrong et al.) and Layne-Farrar, supra note 
6 (also raising several challenges to Armstrong et al.). 
9 Régibeau et al., supra note 2, at 19. 
10 See Part I.C, infra.  
11 See, e.g., Jason R. Bartlett & Jorge L. Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader Save the 
Internet of Things, __ REV. LITIG. __, Part I.D (2017, forthcoming); Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent 
Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to Contribution?, 32 (NBER Working Paper No. 21678, 2015) 
(“Failure to prevent patent hold-up relating to tomorrow’s information technology and communications standards is 







considering the aggregate royalties that would apply if other [SEP] holders made royalty 
demands of the implementer.”12 Royalty calculation methodologies that seek to address these 
issues can broadly be termed “top-down” approaches because they look first to the overall level 
of royalties associated with a standard and then seek to allocate the appropriate portion of this 
total to individual patent holders. Top-down approaches implicitly recognize that, when multiple 
patents cover a single standard, the rate charged by one SEP holder will necessarily affect the 
rates that the other SEP holders are able to obtain from a single manufacturer.13 
 
Top-down approaches contrast with “bottom-up” royalty approaches, in which royalties 
due to individual patent holders are determined independently of one another, and the total 
royalty burden emerges only as the sum of its individual components.14  Courts applying bottom-
up approaches have used different royalty calculation criteria and factors case by case, even 
when patents covering the same features of the same standard have been involved, thus yielding 
inconsistent and potentially excessive results.15  For example, in 2013 and 2014, five different 
U.S. district courts calculated royalties for a total of thirty-five SEPs covering Wi-Fi standards.  
The aggregate royalty for these thirty-five patents amounted to approximately 4.5% of the total 
sale price of a typical $50 Wi-Fi router.16  Yet it has been estimated that there are approximately 
3,000 patents covering the Wi-Fi standard,17 nearly one hundred times the number subject to 
adjudication thus far. Were the royalty for each of these patents to be calculated in a similarly 
uncoordinated, bottom-up manner, the aggregate patent royalty on a Wi-Fi router could easily 
surpass the product’s total selling price by at least an order of magnitude.  
 
B.  Top-Down Approaches in the Courts 
 
Due to the issues noted above, a number of courts around the world have begun to 
explore the use of top-down royalty allocation methodologies for standardized products. The 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois took a step in this direction in Innovatio, 
when it held that the aggregate per-product royalty attributable to the Wi-Fi standard should be 
$1.80, and then apportioned a fraction of this total to the plaintiff.18 As noted by the trial judge, a 
“Top Down approach best approximates the RAND rate that the parties to a hypothetical ex ante 
negotiation most likely would have agreed upon…”19 
____________________	
	
12 Innovatio, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *62 (internal quotes omitted). 
13 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2011 (“the royalty rate negotiated by one patent holder is affected by 
the rates the downstream firm pays to other patent holders, so a proper analysis must account for the joint 
determination  of all the royalty rates”). 
14 See Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 11, at Part I.D (discussing and providing examples of bottom-up 
calculations). 
15 See id. at __ and Table 2. 
16 Id. 
17 Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *179. 
18 See id.at *83. 
19 Id. at *163. See also Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, __ TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. __, ms pp. 
43-44 (forthcoming 2017) (discussing Innovatio top-down analysis), Pentheroudakis & Baron, supra note 1, at 95-







 Likewise, in Samsung v. Apple Japan20, the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court held 
that the aggregate royalty burden for the 3G UMTS standard should not exceed 5%. It then 
allocated a portion of this total royalty to Samsung’s asserted UMTS-essential patent based on 
the total number of SEPs likely to be essential to the standard.21 
 Perhaps the most significant recent use of a top-down FRAND royalty calculation occurred 
in Unwired Planet v. Huawei, decided by the UK High Court of Justice (Patents) in April, 
2017.22 In this case, the court determined the aggregate royalty attributable to a standard under all 
applicable SEPs and then allocated an appropriate amount to the SEP holder asserting the patents 
in suit. Under the court’s top-down methodology, the FRAND royalty was calculated as the 
aggregate SEP royalty burden of a particular standard on a product (i.e., the portion of a 
smartphone’s price that should be charged for all patents covering 4G) multiplied by the 
percentage of the total number of SEPs held by the plaintiff.23  To calculate the aggregate royalty 
burden attributable to the various standards in suit, the court considered public statements made 
by other holders of SEPs with respect to royalties on those standards.24  It then calculated the 
plaintiff’s share of the total SEP pool, using a variety of counting and filtering methodologies, 
including a filter for the likely essentiality of the patents in the asserted portfolio.25  The result 
calculated by the court was consistent with the result that it obtained using a methodology based 
on comparable licenses.26	 
 
C. Top-Down Approaches and Privateering 
 
In addition to helping courts more fairly determine the royalties owed to individual patent 
holders, top-down approaches to SEP royalties may also help to address emerging issues 
associated with “privateering” of SEPs.27 An increasing number of operating companies that 
were or are active in standards development appear to be transferring some or all of their SEPs to 
patent assertion entities (PAEs) for enforcement. One 2015 study found that 77% of all 
assertions of SEPs covering seven widely-adopted interoperability standards made in U.S. 
____________________	
	
20 Apple Japan Godo Kaisha v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., IP High Court of Japan, 2013 (Ne) 10043 (May 
16, 2014). 
21 Id. at 132, 137-38 (noting that out of 1889 patent families declared as essential to UMTS, an independent 
research report issued by Fairfield Resources International, Inc. found that only 529 of these patent families “are or 
are likely to be essential” to the standard.  Accordingly, the court based the royalty due to Samsung on a total pool 
of 529, rather than 1889, SEP families). 
22 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017). 
23 Id. at ¶178. 
24 Id. at ¶¶264-272.  
25 Id. at ¶¶325 et seq. 
26 Id. at ¶476. In Unwired Planet, the court did not use the above top-down methodology as its primary means 
for calculating the FRAND royalty, but as a “cross check” of the result that it obtained using the “comparables” 
methodology. The reasons that the court discounted the top-down methodology in this case are discussed in Part I.D, 
below. 
27 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Patent Privateering: The Rise of Hybrid Patent Assertion Entities in PATENT 
ASSERTION ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY, Ch. 5 (D. Daniel Sokol, ed. 2017); Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F. 
Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 871 (2016); BJÖRN LUNDQVIST, STANDARDIZATION 







district courts between 2000 and 2015 were made by non-practicing entities.28  Another recent 
study found that more than 12% of all declared SEPs have been transferred at least once, 
outstripping the industry average of 9%.29 Indeed, the PAEs asserting SEPs in both the Innovatio 
and Unwired Planet cases obtained those SEPs from operating companies.30 
 
In one recent case, Apple alleged that Nokia, the holder of a large SEP portfolio covering 
wireless telecommunications technologies, conspired with Acacia and other PAEs to divide 
Nokia’s SEP portfolio so as to inflate licensees’ overall royalty burdens. Apple alleged that this 
conduct violated both the SEP holder’s FRAND commitments to ETSI and U.S. antitrust law, 
and that Nokia and the PAEs entered into a scheme to “diffuse and abuse” Nokia’s SEP portfolio 
by forcing manufacturers to defend multiple suits by different plaintiffs and “demanding far 
more in royalties than [Nokia] could have sought on its own”.31 Nokia is alleged to have retained 
a financial interest in the proceeds earned by Acacia and the other PAEs from assertion of the 
SEPs.32 
 
Irrespective of the outcome of this case, it is clear the ability of a SEP holder to increase 
the total royalty burden associated with a SEP portfolio by diffusing the constituent SEPs among 
a group of PAEs would be reduced if a top-down royalty approach were used.  That is, if the 
aggregate royalty associated with a particular SEP portfolio were known and fixed in advance, 
then the number of entities holding and possibly asserting individual SEPs would be immaterial: 
the aggregate royalty would be the same. It is only when royalties are determined in a case-by-
case, bottom-up manner that serial adjudications can yield aggregate royalty burdens that can 
greatly exceed the value of a SEP portfolio. 
 
D.   Insufficient Information for Judicial Aggregate Royalty Assessments  
 
Though, as discussed above, courts have become increasingly drawn to top-down 
aggregate royalty assessments for SEPs, reliable and systematic methods of determining the 
aggregate royalty burden on a particular standard have yet to be developed.  One reason that 
aggregate royalty determinations are difficult to make in the current environment is that the 
royalty rates charged by SEP holders are typically subject to strict confidentiality restrictions and 
are largely opaque to the public. Thus, though litigants may be required to disclose their own 
license agreements and rates in a judicial proceeding, there is little that can be done to learn the 
royalty rates of other holders of SEPs covering the same standard if they are not parties to the 
____________________	
	
28 Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls—Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered Patents, 12 J. COMP. L. 
& ECON. 507, 528 (2016). See also Jorge L. Contreras, Fabian Gaessler, Christian Helmers, and Brian Love 
Litigation of Standards-Essential Patents in Europe: A Comparative Analysis, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. __ (2017, 
forthcoming) (finding significant levels of SEP assertion by non-practicing entities in Germany and the United 
Kingdom). 
29 Tim Pohlmann & Knut Blind, Landscaping Study on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) at 31, Study 
Commissioned by European Commission DG GROW Unit F.5 (2016). 
30 Innovatio obtained its asserted SEPs from Broadcom. Unwired Planet acquired its asserted SEPs from 
Ericsson. 
31 Apple Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., Complaint. No. 16-CV-7266 at 2, 4 (N.D. Cal., filed Dec. 20, 2016). 







litigation.  This lack of transparency pervades industries such as wireless telecommunications 
and computer networking, which are heavily dependent on standardized technologies, and makes 
the determination of aggregate royalty rates for these standards challenging at best.33 
 
Faced with these challenges, courts seeking to adopt top-down royalty methodologies 
have been forced to rely upon less reliable means of determining aggregate royalty burdens for 
widely-adopted standards. Thus, in most of the cases cited above, courts have used a 
combination of public statements by SEP holders and other industry participants coupled with 
other market factors to assess aggregate royalty burdens on standards.  For example, in Unwired 
Planet, the court notes eight different press releases and public statements in which industry 
participants estimated either the total royalty burden for ETSI’s 3G and 4G standards, or their 
share of SEPs covering those standards.34 In some cases, these rates appeared to be mere ballpark 
estimates35 and, as noted by the judge, were “obviously self-serving”.36 As a result of the limited 
probative value of this evidence, the court chose to use the top-down aggregate royalty rates that 
it determined solely as a cross-check against the royalty rates that it calculated using comparable 
license agreements, which it viewed, at least, as “concrete data points.” 37 
 
Even more tenuous evidence was utilized by the Japanese IP High Court in Samsung v. 
Apple Japan38, which established an aggregate royalty rate of 5% for ETSI’s 3G UMTS 
standard.  Like the UK court in Unwired Planet, the Japanese court relied on four public 
statements and informal agreements among industry participants relating to an aggregate 5% 
royalty cap for UMTS SEPs.39 On this basis, the court reasons that “many owners of the UMTS 
standard essential patents support the 5% aggregate royalty cap with a view to preventing the 




33 See Jorge L. Contreras, Colleen Chien, Thomas Cotter and Brad Biddle. Study Proposal – Commercial Patent 
Licensing Data (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755706 (critiquing lack of 
transparency in license transactions).  
34 Similar statements were recently relied upon by the parties in TCL Communication Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. SACV14-00341 JVS (DFMx), TCL’s Redacted Trial Brief at 8 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) [hereinafter TCL Trial Brief]. 
35 For example, in one public statement by “wireless industry leaders”, the maximum reasonable aggregate 
royalty level for the 4G LTE standard should be a “single-digit percentage of the sales price”. Unwired Planet at 
¶264(i).  Another press release by Huawei anticipated “a low single-digit percentage of sales prices as a reasonable 
maximum aggregate royalty rate applicable to end-user devices”.  Id. at ¶264(iii).  This is not to say, of course, that 
such statements should be disregarded entirely.  In other work, I have argued that public statements made by patent 
holders in order to influence the market should presumptively be enforceable against them. Jorge L. Contreras, A 
Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV 479 (2015). But 
while such enforcement could, and should, hold patent holders to their promises, it does little to address the problem 
of aggregate royalty burdens across multiple patent holders. 
36 Unwired Planet at ¶269.   
37 Id. at ¶270.  Fortuitously, the royalty rates calculated by the court using the comparables methodology were 
quite similar to those calculated using the top-down methodology. 
38 Apple Japan Godo Kaisha v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., IP High Court of Japan 2013 (Ne) 10043 (May 
16, 2014). 
39 Id. at 131. 







A different approach to determining the aggregate royalty burden for the 3,000 patents 
essential to the Wi-Fi standard was utilized by the court in Innovatio. There, the court first 
determined, based on expert testimony, that the average profit margin on the sale of a Wi-Fi chip 
during the relevant period was 12.1%.41  It then multiplied this percentage by the average price 
of a Wi-Fi chip during the period ($14.85), yielding an average total profit of $1.80 per chip.42 
The court reasoned that a chip manufacturer could spend no more than its total profit on patent 
royalties, and therefor equated the aggregate royalty for all Wi-Fi SEPs to the chip maker’s total 
profit.43  
 
While this methodology has merits, it also suffers from a number of questionable 
assumptions.  First, if a chip manufacturer paid its entire profit to SEP holders, there would be 
little reason for that manufacturer to remain in business. Clearly, the manufacturer should be 
entitled to retain some share of the profit on its sales. More importantly, it assumes that the 
manufacturer’s profit of $1.80 per chip does not already reflect the payment of patent royalties, 
leaving the full amount available for royalty payments.  However, it may be the case that the 
manufacturer is already paying $1.00 per chip in patent royalties, reducing what would otherwise 
be a profit of $2.80 to $1.80. Finally, while allocating a manufacturer’s entire profit to patents 
covering a single standard may be somewhat plausible for a product such as a Wi-Fi router, 
which has as its primary purpose the transmission of Wi-Fi signals, it is difficult to apply to 
products such as smartphones and laptops that are compliant with hundreds of standards.44  Thus, 
like aggregate royalty calculations based on public statements, the total profit methodology 
utilized in Innovatio is substantially lacking in precision. 
 
In each of these cases, once the aggregate royalty burden for the relevant standard was 
determined, the total was apportioned to allocate a corresponding share of the total to the 
asserting SEP holder.45 But while the court in each of these cases devoted significant attention to 
adopting a  top-down approach to SEP royalty determination, the effort in each case faltered due 
to the difficulty of determining the aggregate royalty burden for the standard in question. The 
next section discusses proposals for improving that determination. 
 
II. PROPOSALS FOR AGGREGATING SEP ROYALTIES 
 
As discussed above, a top-down approach to calculating SEP royalties avoids potential 
stacking issues when multiple SEPs cover a single standard.  However, accurately determining 
____________________	
	
41 Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 at *174. 
42 Id. at *180. 
43 See id. at *161 (“In the hypothetical negotiation, chip manufacturers facing a demand for a royalty far 
outstripping their expected profit margin would not agree to take a license on the patents, but would instead exit the 
chip-making business.”)  See also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (“you can’t pay 
too many royalties before you just run out of profits”). 
44 See, e.g., Brad Biddle, Andrew White, & Sean Woods, How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other 
Empirical Questions), 2010 Int’l Telecomm. Union Sec. Telecomm. Standardization, Kaleidoscope Acad. Conf. 
Proc. at 3 & fig. 2 (finding 251 standards implemented in a typical out-of-the-box laptop computer). 
45 The method for accomplishing this allocation varies from case to case and itself presents a number of 







the aggregate royalty burden for all SEPs covering a standard has proven difficult within a 
litigation framework.  Courts, relying on evidence presented by the parties to the litigation, lack 
the broader perspective of the other holders of SEPs covering the relevant standard, and, as 
shown above, the benchmarks that have previously been employed to determine aggregate 
royalty levels are crude, at best.46 
 
Nevertheless, over the past several years a variety of proposals have been made that 
could improve the determination of aggregate royalty levels for standards. Many of these 
proposals seek to improve the accuracy of individual FRAND royalty determinations rather than 
aggregate royalty levels for all SEPs covering a standard. Nevertheless, these proposals are 
informative when thinking about the determination of aggregate royalty levels.  They include 
both means for improving judicial royalty determinations, as well as modifications to the 
privately ordered interactions among SDO participants.  
 
A.  Litigation Approaches 
   
 One of the issues that impacts the calculation of FRAND royalties in litigation is the fact 
that, in typical patent lawsuit, the plaintiff is a single patent holder.  That patent holder has the 
burden of demonstrating the value of its patented technology by introducing evidence not only of 
its technical merit, but also of the time, effort and ingenuity that went into its development. In 
this setting, every patented technology can be made to appear revolutionary.  Missing from this 
picture, however, are the many other patented technologies that contribute to the standard that 
the asserted patents cover.47 The value of a patented technology, especially one covering a 
standard, must be evaluated not in isolation, but in comparison to the other technological 
contributions to the standard.48 But infringement actions are litigated patent by patent, patent 
holder by patent holder. In a typical action, the owners of the other patented and unpatented 
technologies embodied in a standard are not represented. Rather, the accused infringer must 
describe the hundreds or thousands of other SEPs covering the standard. Needless to say, this 
process is not likely to result in an accurate portrayal of the aggregate value of the patented 
contributions to a standard, nor a useful framework for calculating the aggregate royalty burden 
on that standard.49 
____________________	
	
46 Stanley Besen argues that, given the lack of information available to courts, courts, in general, should not be 
placed in the position of determining FRAND royalty rates at all. Stanley M. Besen, Why Royalties for Standard 
Essential Patents Should not be Set by the Courts, 15 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 19 (2016). 
47 For example, Justus Baron and Tim Pohlmann report that more than 40,000 and 60,000 SEPs have been 
declared to cover ETSI’s 3G and 4G standards, respectively. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to 
Patents Using Databases of Declared Standard-Essential Patents and Systems of Technological Classification 9–10 
(Regulation & Econ. Growth, Working Paper, 2015), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/documents/Baron_Pohlmann_Mapping_Standards.pdf. 
48 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *__ (W.D. Wash., Apr. 25, 2013), 
aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (the SEP holder must demonstrate both the value of its patented technology to 
the relevant standard and the value of the standard to the overall product in which it is implemented). 
49 This problem, and other weaknesses in the current litigation system relating to SEP royalty calculations, are 







 As a result, Jason Bartlett and I have recently proposed that the venerable procedural 
mechanism of statutory interpleader be resuscitated for suits involving the assertion of patents 
covering complex technical standards.50 The interpleader action allows all parties having an 
interest in a particular asset (e.g., the funds that a manufacturer has available to pay patent 
royalties with respect to a standard) to be haled into court in a single action to divide that asset 
amongst themselves. In an interpleader action, each SEP holder may make the case for the value 
and contribution of its own patented technology.  Such an action would thus overcome the 
information gaps that otherwise limit the analytical power of judicial determinations and are 
likely to produce a far more accurate result than the methodologies used by courts to date. 
 This being said, multiparty actions will demand significant resources, both from the parties 
and the judicial system.  While this level of expenditure may be justified in cases involving large 
product markets and multiple competing SEP holders, it may be desirable to find a more 
economical alternative for more modest technologies.  The next section reviews private ordering 
proposals that may address this need. 
 
B.  SDO-Based Approaches 
 
A number approaches have been proposed that could be taken by SDOs to facilitate the 
assessment of aggregate SEP royalties. Unlike courts, SDO participants, taken together, have 
relatively complete information regarding the technologies and patents necessary to determine 
the value of the relevant standards. Thus, SDOs, which, in essence, are simply aggregations of 
market actors, may be well-placed to develop the most accurate aggregate royalty burdens for 
standards. SDO-based approaches useful for determining aggregate royalty burdens fall into two 
broad categories:  those that involve unilateral action by SEP holders, and those that require 
coordination among multiple SEP holders. 
 
1. Unilateral Approaches - Ex Ante Disclosure 
 
Unilateral approaches generally require patent holders to disclose the maximum rates that 
they would charge for their SEPs should a patented technology be incorporated into a standard.  
This approach results in what Joshua Lerner and Jean Tirole refer to as “structured price 
commitments”, in which all SEP holders are required to commit, noncooperatively and 
simultaneously, to price caps on royalties.51 If all SEP holders made such commitments, then 
SDO participants would know, for each potential standard, the aggregate royalty burden 
associated with that standard. In theory, if alternative technologies were available for 





51 Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents, 123 J. POLITICAL ECON. 547 (2015). See also 
Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, Identifying Benchmarks for Applying Non-Discrimination in FRAND, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., Aug. 2014, at 6-7 (referring to such commitments as “preannouncement”); Mark Lemley, Ten 
Things to do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. Rev. 149, 158 (2007) (proposing that 








A logical extension of disclosing rates prior to finalization of a standard is the “auction” 
approach modelled by Daniel Swanson and William Baumol.52 They liken the selection of 
patented technologies for standardization to an auction in which patent holders compete, based 
on technical merit and price, to be included in a standard. They reason that such an auction 
process would result in the selected technologies being priced at their incremental value above 
the next best alternative, and excluding any “hold-up” value attributable to the later adoption of 
the standard.53 Thus, more than simply announcing their royalty rates, patent holders would be 
able to modify those rates in response to competitive pressure.54  
 
These approaches, which have been characterized in the literature as structured price 
commitments, pre-announcements, pre-negotiation and auctioning, are generally referred to in 
the industry as “ex ante” disclosure approaches.55 Ex ante disclosure policies have been adopted 
by a handful of organizations.  In 2006, the Next-Generation Mobile Networks consortium 
(NGMN), a group comprised primarily of European mobile network operators, adopted a policy 
that required members to disclose their maximum SEP royalty rates to a trusted third party, 
which then combined the disclosed rates and reported the aggregated figures to the members.56 
Unfortunately, allowing members to report their maximum rates anonymously and without the 
need for explanation apparently led to significant inflation in reported rates. According to one 
researcher, the aggregate royalties reported to NGMN with respect to some standards approached 
130% of the relevant product price and were often structured in a complex manner that made 
comparison difficult.57 
 
An ex ante disclosure policy was more successfully adopted by the VMEbus International 
Trade Association (VITA) in 2007.58 The VITA policy (which remains in effect today) requires 
members to disclose their maximum royalty rates for SEPs covering a standard prior to voting to 
adopt that standard.  Though one large patent holder (Motorola) strenuously objected to VITA’s 
____________________	
	
52 Daniel G. Swanson and William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards 
Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2005).  
53 Id. at 13. 
54 Despite its theoretical appeal, the Swanson-Baumol auction approach is not generally viewed as a solution 
that could practically be adopted in the current standard-setting environment. See, e.g., Farrell, et al., supra note 3, at 
635 (questioning whether such an auction process is practical) and Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet & A. Jorge 
Padilla, Preventing Patent Hold Up: An Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard 
Setting, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 451-52 (2009) (“the practical challenges of designing, organizing, and implementing 
such an auction likely rule out this method for anything more than hindsight-assisted thought experiments”). 
55 See, e.g., PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 46-47 (Keith Maskus & 
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 49-
56 (2007) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR], COMM. ON TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL, App. A (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007) [hereinafter ABA 
PATENT POLICY MANUAL] (referring to the “Ex Ante” Question); 
56 See Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical 
Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163, 178-79 (2013). 
57 CLAUDIA TAPIA, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND LICENSING PRACTICES 
(FRAND) IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 194 (2010). 







ex ante policy and eventually withdrew from the organization,59 the policy was generally popular 
with the membership and viewed as improving the standardization process.60 In addition, VITA 
sought and obtained a favourable business review letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, 
acknowledging the potentially procompetitive benefits this approach.61 The European 
Commission has likewise indicated that unilateral ex ante disclosures of most restrictive 
licensing terms do not, in principle, restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(a) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).62 
 
Despite the apparent success of VITA’s ex ante policy, few, if any, other SDOs have 
followed its lead.63 There are many possible reasons for the unwillingness of most SDOs to adopt 
ex ante disclosure policies.64 But whatever the reasons, unless there is a sea change in the attitude 
of SDO participants, policies requiring individual SEP holders to disclose royalty rates do not 
seem like viable mechanisms to develop information regarding aggregate royalty burdens for 
standards. 
 
2. Coordinated Approaches - Aggregate Caps 
 
Though unilateral declarations of maximum royalty rates offer improved transparency for 
standards developers and product manufacturers, even the most accurate and honest unilateral 
declarations do not address issues that can arise when multiple “reasonable” royalties are stacked 
on top of one another. And while auctions and other iterative processes may result in the 
rationalization of overall royalty rates, such processes may be vulnerable to gamesmanship and 
____________________	
	
59 Id. at 174-75. 
60 Id. at 204-05. 
61 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Business Review Letter to VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA) (Oct. 30, 
2006) [hereinafter DOJ 2006 VITA Letter]. See also Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, at 8 
(Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf (“We saw then and 
continue to see now, the potential benefits to competition of such an approach.”) 
62 See European Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements, Para. 299 (2011) (“standard-setting agreements providing 
for ex ante disclosures of most restrictive licensing terms, will not, in principle, restrict competition within the 
meaning of Article 101(1)”). See also VALERIO TORTI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION IN 
STANDARD SETTING 197-205 (2016) (noting the European Commission’s generally favorable view toward unilateral 
ex ante disclosure of maximum terms). 
63 See Rudi Bekkers & Andrew Updegrove, A Study of IPR Policies and Practices of a Representative Group of 
Standards Setting Organizations Worldwide 94-97 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/U6FN-XK2E (of ten SDOs 
studied, only VITA requires ex ante disclosure, while IEEE, ETSI and IETF permit it voluntarily). See also 
Contreras – Ex Ante, supra note 56, at 175-77, 179-80. Because ex ante disclosure is not mandatory, there have 
been very few royalty disclosures at IEEE or ETSI. At IETF, a large number of disclosures have been made relating 
to SEP holders’ commitments to license on a royalty-free basis, but very few disclosures state a non-zero royalty 
rate. Id. at 182-83.  
64 See Contreras – Ex Ante, supra note 56, at 210-12 (discussing possible reasons for failure of SDOs to adopt 
ex ante disclosure policies); DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 55, at 50 (discussing possible reasons for lack 
of ex ante negotiation), Régibeau, et al., supra note 2, at 43 (discussing shortcomings and “practical difficulties” 







defection.  Coordinated determination of aggregate royalty rates, however, has the potential to 
yield aggregate rates that include the bulk of SEPs covering a particular standard. 
 
Unlike unilateral approaches, which focus on the disclosure and possible adjustment of 
royalty rates by individual patent holders, coordinated approaches require the participation of all 
(or a substantial number) of the holders of SEPs pertaining to a particular standard. As Dennis 
Carlton and Allan Shampine explain, pre-negotiation of terms by SEP holders can reduce the 
likelihood of hold-up “as long as firms that can influence the standard can determine, prior to the 
standard being set, the terms that would be offered if the patent were to be adopted into the 
standard.”65 Though details vary, coordinated approaches generally seek to establish an overall 
ceiling or cap on the aggregate SEP royalties that are applicable to a standard. Various 
methodologies can then be used to allocate that total among individual SEP holders.66 As such, 
these coordinated approaches offer an inherently top-down approach to SEP royalties.  
 
Coordinated approaches have been endorsed by commentators, agency officials and SDO 
participants themselves.  In some cases, leading market actors seeking to encourage adoption of a 
new standard or technology have joined together the make public pledges regarding the rates that 
they will charge for their patents.67 For example, between 2002 and 2013, major wireless 
telecommunications technology providers including Nokia, Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent, Motorola 
Mobility and Qualcomm made both individual and joint public commitments to cap the royalties 
that they would seek on standards such as W-CDMA, LTE and WiMax.68 It is likely that 
voluntary commitments such as these helped to induce manufacturers and other market actors to 
adopt standards known to be covered by significant numbers of patents.  This being said, such 
commitments have been made by only a handful of SEP holders, leaving the majority of SEP 
holders unaffected.  Moreover, as noted above, there is a growing trend toward transfer of SEPs 
to patent assertion entities, which may not be bound by pricing commitments made by SEP 
holders outside of the SDO setting.69 Thus coordinated approaches like these, while better than 





65 Carlton & Shampine, supra note 51, at 7. 
66 Allocation methodologies, while critical to the determination of FRAND royalties, are subject to an extensive 
literature, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article.  See, generally, Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 
11, at x (cataloging a range of patent valuation and allocation methodologies, including proportionality/head count, 
citation count, cost recovery, real option value, substitute cost, footprint, discounted cash flow and comparable 
license analysis (with associated citations)).  
67 See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 578-80 (2015) (discussing economic and 
strategic rationales for SEP holder pledges beyond the requirements of SDOs).  
68 Id. at 559–61 and Table 4 (discussing maximum royalty commitments made with respect to wireless 
telecommunications standards). As noted above, the courts in Unwired Planet and Apple Japan referred to several of 
these pledges in assessing an aggregate royalty burden applicable to ETSI’s 2G/3G/4G wireless standards.  See notes 
34-35, supra, and accompanying text. 
69 See Contreras – Outsiders, supra note 28, at 520-21 (outsiders to the SDO process may not be bound by 







3. Coordinated Approaches – Joint Negotiation 
 
While the coordination of aggregate royalty caps by SEP holders can yield benefits, such 
caps are most likely to be accepted broadly if the potential manufacturers of standardized 
products are involved in determining aggregate royalty levels.70 The involvement of standards 
implementers in the royalty determination process can yield several benefits.  Most obviously, of 
course, it will be more likely to result in an aggregate royalty that is viewed as acceptable and 
reasonable within the relevant industry, resulting in a greater willingness by implementers to 
enter into license agreements with SEP holders and fewer disputes over SEP holders’ compliance 
with FRAND and other licensing obligations.  Moreover, the involvement of implementers in the 
royalty determination process may lead to royalty rates that more accurately reflect their on-the-
ground knowledge of production costs and cycles, as well as potential market demand for the 
standardized products. 
 
The collective determination of aggregate SEP royalty rates by SEP holders and 
implementers can be viewed as a multilateral joint negotiation. Joint royalty negotiation 
proposals have been made by a number of academic commentators.  Joseph Farrell and co-
authors reason that collective negotiation of royalty rates may avoid both hold-up as well as 
practical difficulties arising from bilateral negotiation.71 They suggest that a beneficial approach 
would be  
 
to permit members of an SSO collectively to negotiate royalties with patent 
holders, so long as membership in the SSO does not preclude any individual firm, 
or group of firms acting in concert, from producing competing products that do 
not comply with the standard. This approach recognizes the benefits of collective 
negotiation to prevent hold-up and subjects the SSO to rule of reason evaluation.72 
 
Richard Gilbert also reasons that “if standard-related holdup is likely and substantial, 
joint negotiation of licensing terms by the members of an SSO before a standard issues can help 
____________________	
	
70 Some have suggested that governmental intervention may be necessary to determine appropriate aggregate 
royalty caps for SEPs.  See, e.g., Govt. of India, Dept. of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Discussion Paper on 
Standard Essential Patents and Their Availability on FRAND Terms at 26 ¶11.f (1 Mar. 2016) (asking “Whether 
total payment of royalty in case of various SEPs used in one product should be capped? If so, then should this limit 
be fixed by Government of India or some other statutory body or left to be decided among the parties?”) [hereinafter 
India DIPP Discussion Paper].  Such proposals have met with both opposition and approval.  See, e.g., Am. Bar 
Assn. Sections of Antitrust Law, Intell. Prop. Law, Intl. Law and Sci. & Tech. Law, Joint Comments on the 
Government of India’s Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and Their Availability on FRAND Terms at 
14 (“While some SSOs might seek to adopt pricing caps or other voluntary policies, the Sections do not support 
governmental imposition of industry royalty caps through legislation, regulation or other means”) and Centre for 
Internet & Society, India, Comments on the Dept. of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Discussion Paper on Standard 
Essential Patents and Their Availability on FRAND Terms at 8-9 (supporting governmental imposition of aggregate 
royalty caps).  Because the focus of this article is on private sector joint negotiation of aggregate royalty caps, the 
complex issue of governmental rate setting is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
71 See Farrell, et al., supra note 2, at 632 (“decentralized or bilateral (patent holder/user) negotiations do not fit 
well with the [collective] mechanisms by which standards are chosen”). 







fill the  void left by vague FRAND commitments to limit possible opportunistic conduct”.73 In 
prior work, I have proposed a methodology termed a “pseudo-pool” in which all relevant 
stakeholders in a standards-development group, including both SEP holders and product 
manufacturers, must negotiate and agree upon an aggregate royalty rate for all SEPs covering a 
standard before the standard is approved or published.74 I suggest that “[c]onsistent with the 
FRAND commitment, the Aggregate Royalty must be ‘reasonable’, taking into account the 
expected overall market for standardized products, historical royalty rates in the industry, typical 
product price ranges, and the like.”75 If an SDO does not wish to be the locus for royalty-setting 
negotiations, then “it may authorize a neutral, outside party (e.g., an arbitration panel or neutral 
expert appointed by a respected external agency such as the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) or World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)) to facilitate the Aggregate Royalty 
determination.”76 Once the aggregate royalty is determined, a subsequent procedure for 
allocation among the SEP holders is proposed.77  Finally, because the agreed aggregate rate 
would be adopted by the relevant SDO, it (and the manner in which royalties are allocated 
among SEP holders) would be binding on all SDO participants, even if they declined to 
participate in the rate negotiation.78 What’s more, courts would consistently be able to look to the 
SDO’s publicly announced aggregate royalty rates in every case, whether the SEP holder were a 
manufacturer, technology developer or PAE. 
 
 In a recent report commissioned by the European Commission, Pierre Régibeau, Raphaël 
De Coninck and Hans Zenger of Charles River Associates also support the use of aggregate 
royalty caps in standard-setting.79 They argue that such caps “can be helpful to alleviate the 
negative effects of both hold-up and royalty stacking.”80 They find market-wide benefits arising 
from such arrangements, noting that “coordinated pricing of strict complements may allow 
limiting potentially excessive royalty requests on the part of individual licensors, thereby leading 
to lower final consumer prices and hence more successful commercialization of end products.”81 
And, as in my earlier proposal, Régibeau et al. recognize that in order to be successful, a 
____________________	
	
73 Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 858 (2011) (reasoning, however, that bilateral negotiations among SEP holders and 
implementers may produce similar results if strong non-discrimination provisions are applied). See also Layne-
Farrar et al., supra note 54, at 474 (ex ante bilateral negotiation should be encouraged over joint negotiation). 
74 Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 78-84 (2013). This proposal is an expanded version of a proposal submitted to the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) Patent Roundtable held in Geneva on October 10, 2012, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2159749.  
75 Id. at 79-80. 
76 Id. at 80 (citations omitted). 
77 Id. at 81-83 (proposing numerical/proportionality based allocation methodology with over-declaration 
penalty). 
78 For a discussion of the binding effect of SDO policies on participants, see Contreras – Market Reliance, supra 
note 35.  It is worth noting that, even if SDO policy commitments bind SDO participants and those to whom they 
transfer their SEPs, there is a chance that some SEP holders may be “outsiders” that are not bound by the SDO’s 
policies.  See Contreras – Outsiders, supra note 28 (finding that a non-negligible portion of SEPs are asserted by 
SDO outsiders). 
79 Régibeau, et al, supra note 2, at 43. 
80 Id. at 43. 







coordinated aggregate royalty cap should involve the participation of significant SEP holders as 
well as product manufacturers.82  
 
 
III.  ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS FOR JOINTLY-NEGOTIATED AGGREGATE ROYALTIES83 
 
A. The Threat of Oligopsony 
 Despite the potential efficiencies that jointly-negotiated aggregate royalty caps may offer 
to standards developers and implementers, few if any SDOs have adopted them.  One of the 
principal reasons offered by SDOs and patent holders for their reluctance to engage in collective 
negotiation of aggregate royalty rates is antitrust law. Specifically, it has been suggested that a 
group of manufacturers negotiating license rates with a SEP holder could collectively exert 
anticompetitive pressure to depress the SEP holder’s royalties below a reasonable level, and even 
to zero, thereby devaluing the patents covering the standard.84 As argued by J. Gregory Sidak, 
“ex ante collective action that is privately undertaken in an [SDO] to counteract potential patent 
holdup may facilitate, if not serve as an outright façade for, horizontal price fixing by 
oligopsonists of the patented input.”85 Another line of objection arises from the potential impact 
of group negotiation on incentives to innovate: “The potential danger .. is that by negotiating as a 
group, technology users could extract such favourable terms from patent holders (another form 
of hold-up) that they will inefficiently discourage future innovation”.86 
 
These arguments have held considerable sway in the industry and have influenced 
enforcement authorities, particularly in Europe. In early 2005, a proposal to cap aggregate 
royalty rates on new wireless telecommunications standards was made to ETSI by several of its 
members.87 Despite significant interest, discussion of this proposal within ETSI was terminated 
following receipt of a 2006 letter from the European Commission’s Competition Directorate-
____________________	
	
82 Id. at 44-45 (“given that patent-holders seem, understandably, more frightened by the idea of an ex ante 
aggregate cap than implementers we would suggest that ex ante aggregate royalty caps be set by the SSO members 
with a significant number of potentially standard-relevant patents”). 
83 The analysis in this Part focuses on U.S. antitrust law. While European competition law is mentioned in 
passing, an analysis of the European legal landscape is beyond the scope of this article. For a comparative analysis 
of U.S. and EU antitrust law in the area of standardization, see LUNDQVIST, supra note 27, and TORTI, supra note 
62. It is worth noting that at least some European scholars believe that European competition law prohibits as cartels 
any “coordinated interference with the free market price system”, even in the face of countervailing procompetitive 
effects, thereby exceeding U.S. antitrust law in prohibiting price-related concerted action. Nicolas Petit, The IEEE-
SA Revised Patent Policy and its Definition of ‘Reasonable’ Rates: A Transatlantic Antitrust Divide? 27 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 211, 213 (2016) (drawing on non-IP cases in questioning whether 
recent amendments to IEEE patent policy run afoul of EU competition law).  But see Marco Lo Bue, Are These 
Cartels? Price Guidelines Adopted by Standard Setting Organizations (US, Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers), 7 J. EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 537 (2016) (concluding that recent IEEE policy 
amendments do not run afoul of EU competition law, despite admitted differences between U.S. and EU law). 
84 J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting Organizations, 5 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123, 142–51 (2009). See also Farrell, et al., supra note 2, at 632. 
85 Sidak, supra note 84, at 126.  
86 Farrell, et al., supra note 2, at 632. 







General.88 The EC’s letter questioned whether an aggregate royalty cap would impermissibly 
preclude price competition, as it would involve fixing the “price” of each SEP in advance.  
Instead of an aggregate royalty cap, the Commission expressed a preference for “pure” 
(unilateral) ex ante disclosures of royalty terms, which would enable price competition among 
competing patented technologies. Eventually, as noted above, ETSI adopted a policy permitting 
voluntary disclosures of royalty terms, but not requiring either individual disclosure of royalty 
terms or collective determination of aggregate royalties.89 
 
The U.S. DOJ and FTC have also recognized the potential for joint negotiations to lead to 
anticompetitive conduct including naked price fixing.90 Short of such per se illegal conduct, such 
joint negotiations might also be prohibited under a rule of reason analysis 
 
if there were no viable alternatives to a particular patented technology that is 
incorporated into the standard, the IP holder's market power was not enhanced by  
the standard, and all potential licensees refuse to license that particular patented 
technology except on agreed-upon licensing terms. In such circumstances, the ex 
ante  negotiation among potential licensees does not preserve competition among 
technologies that existed during the development of the standard but may instead 
simply eliminate competition among the potential licensees for the patented 
technology.91 
 
Responding to concerns of this nature, a number of SDOs, including IEEE and ETSI, 
expressly prohibit the negotiation or discussion of royalty terms during SDO meetings.92 And 
even when such coordinated action is not expressly prohibited, it is frequently raised as a 
concern when aggregate royalty discussions are suggested.93 As observed by Régibeau, et al, 
“part of the antitrust community still has an almost instinctive allergy to the idea of rivals setting 
prices together.”94 If aggregate royalty determinations are to be utilized in top-down FRAND 




88 Angel Tradacete Cocera, Letter to Karl Heinz Rosenbrock, Director General ETSI, June 21, 2006. See TAPIA, 
supra note 57, at 165 (discussing letter and its effects on ETSI process). 
89 See note 63, supra, and accompanying text. 
90 See DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 55, at 51. 
91 Id. at 53. 
92 See IEEE Standards Assn., IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual, §5.3.10.2 (“No discussions or 
other communications regarding the following topics shall occur during IEEE-SA working group standards-
development meetings or other duly authorized IEEE-SA standards-development technical activities: … -- Specific 
patent license terms or other intellectual property rights…”); Eur. Telecom. Standards Inst., ETSI Guide on 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), Version Adopted by Board#94 on 19 September 2013, §4.1 (“Specific licensing 
terms and negotiations are commercial issues between the companies and shall not be addressed within ETSI”). 
93 See Régibeau, et al, supra note 2, at 45 (discussing response of an SDO participant regarding obstacles to 
aggregate royalty caps: “Problem 1 is antitrust”); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2043 (royalty cap approaches 
raise “antitrust flags” given that they involve both discussion and agreement on price); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the 
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 
128 (2001) (“many standard setting organizations are wary of sanctioning any specific agreement regarding the 
magnitude of licensing terms for fear of antitrust liability, as such agreements might be construed as price fixing”). 








B.  Patent Pools and Aggregate Royalty Determinations 
 
Any analysis of aggregated patent royalties would be incomplete without some 
consideration of patent pools. In a typical patent pool covering a standardized technology, 
multiple patent holders designate a single agent to license the pooled patents to third parties at an 
agreed rate and to distribute net revenues among the pool participants in accordance with a pre-
determined formula. Patent pools thus enable product manufacturers to obtain licenses to many 
patents simultaneously with reduced transaction costs. Pools have been employed effectively in 
connection with a number of widely adopted standards such as MPEG-2, CD and DVD. In each 
of these cases, a small group of patent holders formed a pool containing relevant SEPs and 
excluding patents that were not essential to the standard.95 The U.S. Department of Justice has 
reviewed several of these pools and found that they did not raise antitrust concerns. Among the 
procompetitive benefits that the DOJ attributed to these pools was their ability to “create 
substantial integrative efficiencies by reducing the time and expense of disseminating . . . patents 
to interested licensees, clearing blocking positions, and integrating complementary 
technologies.”96 
 
 The rates at which the pooled patents are licensed is determined by agreement among the 
contributing patent holders, taking into account relevant market factors.97 The DOJ and FTC 
have stated that they “generally do not assess the reasonableness of royalties set by patent 
pools.”98 Rather, they “focus on the pool’s formation and whether its structure, including the 
terms of the contract among pool participants, would likely enable pool participants to raise 
prices or restrict output in a relevant market.”99 Thus, merely coordinating the price at which a 
group of patents will be licensed to others is not itself viewed as anticompetitive, absent other 
evidence of anticompetitive behavior.100 
 
 Given the benefits and favorable antitrust assessment of patent pools, it is worth asking 
why voluntary consensus standardization is still carried out through SDOs that do not pool 
essential patents. Recent studies find that the large majority of SEPs are licensed by individual 
SEP holders under SDO FRAND rules, rather than as part of patent pools.101 There are several 
____________________	
	
95 This requirement reduces the risk that the pool will stifle competition by making substitute technologies 
available in the same package and for a single price. See, e.g., Summit Tech., Inc., 127 F.T.C. 208, 217 (1999) 
(decision and order); DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 55, at 76–78; Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Carey R. Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, at 10 (Jun. 
10, 1999) (DVD6C). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit softened the requirement that only essential 
patents be included in pools when the inclusion of a non-essential patent does not result in competitive harm. Princo 
Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Fed. Cir. 2010, p.1338). 
96 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 55, at 71.  
97 See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Ties that Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 
18-25 (2010) (discussing a range of factors that patent pool participants may consider in setting royalty rates). 
98 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 55, at 82. 
99 Id. at 82-83. 
100 Id. at 83. 
101 See Pohlmann and Blind, supra note 29, at 36-37 and Fig. 22 (91% of worldwide declared SEPs are licensed 







reasons that this may be the case. First, the formation of a patent pool can be expensive. Unlike 
SDOs, patent pools must ensure, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that the pooled patents 
are actually essential to the relevant standard.102 For this reason, parties creating patent pools 
typically engage in a lengthy and costly vetting process to assess the essentiality of each patent 
that is proposed for inclusion in the pool. Estimates of the cost of such assessments are in the 
range of US$10,000 per patent.103	Because many SDO standards are never widely adopted or 
have limited application, and given the large numbers of patents that are sometimes involved, 
most SDO participants are reluctant to make up-front investments of this magnitude for every 
standard under development.104 Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro also observe that pool formation 
around complex interoperability standards may be hindered by the number of patentees and 
patents involved, significant variations in the scope and strength of these patents, and the 
involvement of non-manufacturing patent holders.105 Thus, for several reasons, while SDO-
developed standards are vulnerable to the patent stacking issues addressed by patent pools, SEPs 
covering these standards are typically not included in patent pools.  
 
 
C. Joint Negotiation and Procompetitive Benefits 
 
 Like the holders of pooled patents, SDO participants can achieve efficiencies and other 
procompetitive benefits by coordinating the aggregate rates at which SEPs covering a standard 
are licensed. As noted by Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, collective negotiation of SEP royalty 
rates is “very likely to be procompetitive if the technology would otherwise be so encumbered by 
patent rights and blocking positions that the standard would have difficulty moving forward in 
the market.”106 Robert Skitol argues that such joint activity also enhances the “quality of decision 
making” within an SDO and “increases the prospects for achieving a procompetitive ‘open’ 
standards outcome”.107 Moreover, Shapiro observes that some SDOs’ discouragement or outright 
prohibition of ex ante discussion of pricing terms108 has had the ironic result of “embolden[ing] 
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 The U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies have also indicated that ex ante joint negotiation 
of SEP licensing terms has “the strong potential for procompetitive benefits”.110 As early as 
2005, Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of the FTC, specifically explained the potential 
procompetitive benefits of joint ex ante negotiation of licensing terms in the SDO context: 
 
[J]oint ex ante royalty discussions . . . can be a sensible way of preventing hold 
up, which can itself be anticompetitive.  Put another way, transparency on price 
can increase competition among rival technologies striving for incorporation into 
the standard at issue. They may allow the “buyers” (the potential licensees in the 
standard-setting group) to get a competitive price from the “sellers” (the rival 
patentees vying to be incorporated into the standard that the group is adopting) 
before lock in ends the competition for the standard and potentially confers 
market power on the holder of the chosen technology. . . . If joint ex ante royalty 
discussions succeed in staving off hold up, we can generally expect lower royalty 
rates to lead to lower marginal costs for the standardized product and lower 
consumer prices. By mitigating hold up, joint ex ante royalty discussions might 
also make possible the more timely and efficient development of standards. A 
reduction in ex ante uncertainty on royalty rates may reduce the extent to which 
litigation is needed to resolve issues relating to patent and standards. Joint ex ante 
royalty discussions also could prevent delays in the implementation of the 
standard resulting from ex post litigation (or threats of it), which may involve 
inefficient allocation of resources intended for innovation.111 
 
 In response to suggestions that “group buying power” might be used inappropriately by 
SDO members to depress SEP prices, the DOJ and FTC acknowledge that the use of ex ante 
licensing discussions as “a sham to cover up naked agreements on the licensing terms each IP 
holder will offer the SSO”, a means “to reach side price-fixing agreements” or an effort “to fix 
the price of standardized products” would likely be condemned as per se violations of the 
antitrust laws.112 However, the agencies go on to note that these risks “are not sufficient to 
condemn all multilateral ex ante licensing negotiations, particularly given the fact that [t]hose 
developing standards already have extensive experience managing this risk.”113  In contrast, they 
conclude that: 
 
[i]n most cases, it is likely that the Agencies would find that joint ex ante activity 
undertaken by an SSO or its members to establish licensing terms as part of the 
standard-setting process is likely to confer substantial procompetitive benefits by 
____________________	
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avoiding hold up that could occur after a standard is set.114  
 
Based on this reasoning, the agencies conclude that joint ex ante negotiation of licensing terms in 
the standard-setting context should not be condemned as per se illegal, but rather evaluated on a 
rule of reason basis.115 
 
 Michael Carrier identifies several characteristics of SDOs that significantly reduce the 
risk of anticompetitive oligopsonistic behavior by product manufacturers. These include the 
involvement of SEP holders in royalty negotiations, the power that SEP holders wield in the 
standardization process, the unpredictability regarding which patented technologies will 
ultimately be included in a standard, and the inability of product manufacturers to reduce their 
purchases to depress prices.116 
 
 Moreover, were product manufacturers in an SDO to exert the type of oligopsonistic 
downward royalty pressure envisioned by Sidak and others,117 patent holders would likely defect 
from such an SDO.118 The abandonment of an SDO by patent holders would remove such patent 
holders from the ambit of the SDO’s rules, including its FRAND commitments. Thus, forcing 
patent holders out of SDOs would worsen the position of implementers, as SEP-holding 
“outsiders” could charge substantial and comparatively unconstrained (i.e., supra-FRAND) 
royalties for licenses of their SEPs and seek injunctions against the use of their patented 
technologies.119 Thus, even to the extent that potential anticompetitive effects could arise from 
joint negotiation of aggregate royalties, in the words of one senior DOJ official, these must be 
balanced against “the inefficiencies of ex post negotiations and licensing hold up.”120 
 
 Admittedly, it is likely, as several economists predict using different negotiation models, 
that SEP royalties negotiated collectively will be lower than those that would be negotiated in 
serial bilateral transactions.121 This result has the potential to reduce investment incentives for 
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technology developers to participate in standard setting, thereby reducing the overall value of 
standards produced. A reduction of incentives, however, is not fatal from an antitrust 
perspective.  As one DOJ official explains, “harm to a particular faction does not necessarily 
equate to harm to competition. If a particular SDO’s policy would reduce the royalties obtained 
by a particular patentee, that is not necessarily a violation of the antitrust laws.”122 Thus, even if 
royalties to one or a group of SEP holders were reduced as a result of collective negotiation of 
such rates, an antitrust violation would not necessarily arise absent other forms of abusive 
conduct (e.g., coordination of downstream product prices), and would need to be considered in 
light of the procompetitive factors noted above.123 
 
  It is also important to remember that, to date, the debate regarding “joint negotiation” in 
the context of SEP royalties has largely focused on concerted action by potential licensees.  That 
is, the central question has been whether product manufacturers and standards implementers 
within an SDO should be permitted to negotiate with a SEP holder regarding the rates that it will 
charge if its patented technology is included in a standard.  If the proffered rate is too high, then 
the SDO members may chose a less expensive alternative, or persuade the SEP holder to lower 
its rate (hence the spectre of oligopsony). 
 
 But the organizational dynamic with respect to negotiation of aggregate SEP royalties is 
somewhat different. Here, manufacturers and implementers will not be negotiating with 
individual SEP holders, but with all SEP holders as a group. Thus, SEP holders can also form a 
coalition within this negotiation framework, thereby lessening the risk that they will be taken 
advantage of by “buyers” operating in concert.  Moreover, the negotiation leverage of the buyer 
group in this negotiation would be less than it otherwise would be in the traditional joint 
negotiation setting, because, ideally, all SEP holders will be engaged on the “other side”. Thus, if 
implementers exert too much downward pressure on the royalties sought by SEP holders as a 
group, they risk defection not only by a single SEP holder, but by all SEP holders. And once a 
significant number of SEPs become unencumbered by any licensing commitments, the success 
of the proposed standard in the market may be seriously compromised. 
 
 
D. A Role for Agencies in Aggregate Royalty Discussions 
 
Lawyers and engineers are by their natures cautious. As such, it may take more than law 
review articles to persuade SDOs to take the first steps toward authorizing aggregate royalty 
negotiations. Far more persuasive would be affirmative statements from relevant antitrust 
enforcement agencies condoning such coordinated conduct under the right circumstances. In 
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order to assuage the fear of antitrust law, governmental actors can, and should, clarify the 
permissibility of joint negotiation of aggregate royalties within the standardization context.  Such 
clarifications could take several forms.  
 
First are policy documents and guidance issued directly by the agencies.  Enforcement 
agencies such as the DOJ and FTC in the United States, the European Commission in the 
European Union and corresponding agencies in countries such as China, Japan, Korea, India and 
Canada, have all recently published guidelines regarding antitrust, patents and standards.124 Each 
of these agencies could explicitly indicate that antitrust enforcement would be unlikely with 
respect to the negotiation of aggregate royalties for standards, absent other anticompetitive 
conduct.  
 
Second, agencies may respond to requests for clarification and intent that are submitted 
by private parties.  In the U.S. the DOJ’s business review letter procedure offers a convenient 
and (relatively) inexpensive way for parties to obtain an early indication regarding the agency’s 
views of a particular transaction.125 Several such letters have already been issued in the area of 
voluntary consensus standardization.126 To the extent that an SDO were considering 
implementing a joint negotiation approach to develop aggregate SEP royalties for its standards, it 
would do well to consider requesting a business review letter from the DOJ.  This would provide 
the agency with an opportunity to clarify whether the proposed approach raises antitrust 
concerns.127 
 
Finally, the legislature could take action in this regard. For example, in the U.S. a 
relatively modest amendment to the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 
2004,128 a statute that already offers limited antitrust immunity to SDOs, could clarify that 
negotiation and agreement on aggregate royalty caps in standard-setting do not constitute 
violations of the Sherman Act or FTC Act, absent some other anticompetitive conduct. A similar 
legislative approach could be taken in Europe and other countries in which antitrust, patent and 
standards issues are currently the subject of regulatory activity.  
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While agency and legislative action are not required for SDOs to develop and utilize 
aggregate royalty caps, such clarifications by authoritative governmental bodies could clear the 





	 Top-down methodologies for calculating FRAND royalties for patents covering voluntary 
industry standards are increasingly favored by courts and antitrust enforcement agencies. Yet, 
without significant alterations to current litigation systems in the U.S. and elsewhere, bilateral 
disputes between parties offer courts too little information to make informed determinations of 
aggregate royalty levels applicable to particular standards. As a result, the basis for allocating 
royalties among individual patent holders is flawed. A preferred means for determining the 
appropriate aggregate royalty applicable to a particular standard could be joint negotiation 
among SDO participants, including both patent holders and potential manufacturers of 
standardized products, prior to the approval of the standard.  Despite the potential benefits of this 
approach, fears of antitrust liability have caused SDOs to avoid adopting it in their internal 
procedures.  Several SDOs, in fact, prohibit any discussion of royalty levels as part of the SDO’s 
proceedings.   I argue that these fears are largely unfounded, a position that has been validated by 
antitrust enforcement agencies in both the U.S. and Europe. In the large majority of cases, the 
procompetitive benefits of joint negotiation of aggregate royalty levels should outweigh 
anticompetitive harms. The ex ante determination of aggregate royalty levels for standards would 
substantially facilitate bilateral negotiation of SEP license agreements and reduce the complexity 
and unpredictability of SEP litigation. Accordingly, it is time for antitrust enforcement agencies 
to be more explicit in encouraging the use of collective negotiation mechanisms to support the 
determination of aggregate royalty burdens on voluntary industry standards and for SDOs to step 
up to this important role. 
	
